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Abstract 
This paper shows that the development from an agricultural regime through industrialization to a 
manufacturing regime occurs simultaneously to the demographic transition and the change in labor 
structure towards an increasing fraction of skilled labor due to technological progress. The 
manufacturing sector is economically viable when the technological level is sufficiently high. During 
the industrialization, the technological progress makes technology become more complementary to 
skilled labor than to unskilled labor, so that individuals tend to decrease the number of unskilled 
offspring in order to increase the number of skilled ones. This paper also shows that a geographical 
advantage for agriculture helps an economy to be more prosperous in the agricultural regime, but delays 
the timing of industrialization and the timing of demographic transition. Hence, an economy with more 
geographical advantage for agriculture may be overtaken in the development process by another with 
less geographical advantage for agriculture when the level of technology is high enough. 
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1 Introduction
The development process from agriculture to manufacture along with the demographic tran-
sition and the different timings of industrialization, which has lead to the divergence across
countries, are interesting topics in development economics that have been subject of intensive
research in recent years. This paper aims at contributing a mechanism helping to explain
the development from the agricultural regime to the manufacturing regime occurring along
with the demographic transition and the change in labor structure towards an increasing
fraction of skilled labor. Moreover, we highlight the role of geographical advantages for agri-
cultural production in shaping the patterns of economic development, contributing to the
divergence and reversals in economic performance across societies. We show that when the
technological level is low enough, only the agricultural production is operative. Over time,
when the technological level is sufficiently high, the manufacturing production becomes eco-
nomically viable, and the fraction of skilled labor increases along with the accumulation of
technology. This paper sheds light on the fact that a geographical advantage for agricultural
production helps an economy to be more prosperous in the agricultural regime but delays its
industrialization and demographic transition. Moreover, the economic performances may be
reversed in the development process between countries with more geographical advantage for
agriculture and those with less geographical advantage.
The closest literature to this paper may be Ashraf and Galor (2012), “Cultural Diversity,
Geographical Isolation, and the Origin of the Wealth of Nations”, and Galor and Mountford
(2006), “Trade and the Great Divergence: The Family Connection”. This paper, however,
differs significantly from Ashraf and Galor (2012) at least in two fundamental aspects: (i)
Ashraf and Galor (2012) considers the exogenous effects of geographical isolation on cultural
diversity affecting the creation of knowledge to explain the asymmetric evolution across soci-
eties, while this paper explains the asymmetric evolution across societies by considering the
entire geographical environment and resources which are advantageous for agricultural pro-
duction; (ii) Ashraf and Galor (2012) does not take into account the demographic transition
in explaining the development process across societies, while this paper does. This paper also
differs significantly from Galor and Mountford (2006) at least in two aspects: (i) By not tak-
ing into account the role of geography, Galor and Mountford (2006) shows international trade
to be a prime cause of the Great Divergence in per capita income across countries in the last
two centuries, while here we argue that geography is a deeper fundamental cause; (ii) While
this paper explains the switching from agricultural production to manufacturing production,
along with demographic transition, due to technological progress during the development
process, Galor and Mountford (2006) does not.
The two last centuries are characterized by the significant technological progress associated
with the industrial revolution, the demographic transition, and the generalization of basic
education. As a consequence, most societies got out of Malthusian stagnation and experienced
a considerable increase in the income per capita and human capital, as well as a decline in the
growth rate of population as depicted in the Figure 1 for the case of US. The different timings
of the transition from agricultural production to manufacturing production across societies
have shaped considerably the contemporary world economy (as depicted in the Figure 2) and
need to be explained.
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Figure 1. Technological progress, fertility, and return to labor; US 1800 - 2000. Quoted in Greenwood and
Seshadri (2005)
Figure 2. The differential timings of the take-off across regions. Source: Maddison (2003)
The divergence across societies in the two last centuries is also marked by the divergence in
the per capita level of industrialization (measuring per capita volume of industrial production)
which can also be explained in this paper.
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Figure 3. Per capita levels of industrialization (UK in 1900 = 100). Source: Bairoch (1982)
The industrial revolution in Western Europe is reflected by the sharp acceleration in
process of urbanization, as depicted in the Figure 4, which proxies the change in the structure
of labor towards an increasing proportion of manufacturing workers.
Figure 4. Urbanization rate (percentage of city with population larger than 10,000) in Western Europe:
1700–1870. Sources: Bairoch (1988) and De Vries (1984).
Historical evidence shows that the wealth of Asia, particularly China and India, was ahead
of Europe until 11th century. Nonetheless, Asia had been already overtaken by the time of
the Industrial Revolution in the 18th century and beyond. This story is interesting and can
be explained in this paper.
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Figure 5. Comparative levels of GDP per capita (1990 US Dollar): China and Western Europe, 1000 -
1850 A.D. Source: Maddison (2003)
This paper extends Galor and Mountford (2006) by introducing a geographical advantage
for agricultural production to explain the historical facts depicted in Figures 1 to 5 above. The
rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 introduces
the benchmark model. Section 4 analyzes the equilibrium in the labor market. The effects
of technology on fertility and labor structure are analyzed in section 5. The competitive
equilibrium and dynamical system are presented in section 6. Section 7 discusses the role of
geography and a tale of two countries. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Literature Review
There is a huge literature in the research fields of this paper. In this section, we try to review
two strands of economic growth and development literature which relate to this paper: (i)
the emergence of human capital and the demographic transition in unified growth models,
and (ii) the causes of economic growth and the great divergence.
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2.1 Human capital and demographic transition in unified growth models
The role of human capital formation on the demographic transition leading to the great di-
vergence across societies has been emphasized in the unified growth theories advanced by
Galor and Weil (2000) and Galor and Moav (2002), and confirmed empirically by Glaeser
et al. (2004), and recently by Becker and Woessman (2009) and Becker et al. (2010, 2011).
More recently, Cervellati and Sunde (2013) also develop a unified growth model to study
the mechanism generating economic growth and the demographic transition as well as de-
velopment. These papers, in general, show theoretically and quantitatively that the increase
in technologically-driven demand for human capital and its effect on educational investment
play a central role in the transition from Malthusian stagnation, through the demographic
transition, to modern sustained economic growth. Doepke (2004) advances a unified growth
model to examine whether government policies on education and child labor can account for
cross-country variations in fertility decline. He shows that education subsidies have only mi-
nor effects, while accounting for child labor regulation is important. Dao (2013) also proposes
a mechanism linking technology, gender inequality, and fertility in a unified growth model to
explain the demographic transition accompanied with accelerated growth. Dao (2013) high-
lights the role of technological progress not only in freeing women from housework, but also
in improving the equality in human capital between males and females, hence contributing
significantly to the demographic transition during development process.
Hansen and Prescott (2002) advance a two-sector and one-good overlapping generations
model, close to our model, to explain the transition from Malthusian technology to Solow
technology along with the change in labor structure (the fraction of labor in the Solow sector)
and the demographic transition. The model in this paper, however, differs from the one in
Hansen and Prescott (2002) in some fundamental aspects: (i) our model considers a fertility
choice in the utility maximization of the individual, while in Hansen and Prescott (2002),
fertility is a consequence of consumption by young households; (ii) Hansen and Prescott
(2002) does not take into account the heterogeneity of children, while our model does; and
(iii) in Hansen and Prescott (2002), technological progress in both sectors is exogenous, while
our model endogenizes technological progress.
2.2 The causes of economic growth and the great divergence
What triggered economic growth, and why some countries are so rich and some others so poor
are controversial topics in the literature of economic growth. According to Acemoglu (2009,
p.109), any explanation for the differences in income per capita based on the differences across
countries in technology, physical capital, as well as human capital is incomplete. He argues
that if technology, physical capital, and human capital are so important in understanding
differences in the wealth of nations, then why do not some countries improve their technology,
accumulate physical capital, and invest in human capital as much as others do? So there must
be other and deeper reasons that are the fundamental causes of economic growth.
So what could these fundamental causes be? Innumerable causes for economic growth
have been proposed in the literature by economists, historians, and social scientists. Ace-
moglu (2009) classifies the main hypotheses into four categories: (i) the luck hypothesis,
(ii) the culture hypothesis, (iii) the institutions hypothesis, and (iv) the geography hypothe-
sis. He refers by the “luck” hypothesis to the set of causes leading to divergence in economic
performances between countries that are otherwise identical. They can be just different selec-
tions among multiple equilibria. He mentions that “luck” explanations are often theoretically
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grounded. The empirical plausibility of this hypothesis is another matter. The influences of
geographical, cultural, and institutional factors have been at the center of the debate on the
explanation of the remarkable transformation of the world income distribution over last two
centuries.
The significant influence of cultural factors on economic development of Europe and Asia
is originally pioneered by Weber (1905, 1922), and promoted later by Hall (1986), Lal (1998),
and Landes (1998, 2006), among others.2 According to Weber, the origins of the industrial-
ization in Western Europe can be traced to the Protestant reformation and particularly the
rise of Calvinism. Ashraf and Galor (2012) state that: “the Weberian viewpoint places the
proclivity of European culture towards rationalism and the objective “disenchantment of the
world” at the forefront in explaining the rise of industry in the Western world”. Indeed, his
ideas have been proposed as explanations for why Latin American countries are relatively
poor (because of their Iberian culture), while North American countries are more prosperous
(because of their Anglo-Saxon culture), (see Acemoglu 2009, p.122). However, according to
Acemoglu, there are two challenges to the theories of economic growth based on culture:
(i) the difficulty of measuring culture; and (ii) the accounting for miracles, such as those of
Asian Tigers3. If Asian cultural values are crucial for the miracles of these Asian countries,
then why these values did not lead to growth before? If these cultural values are crucial
for the miracle of South Korea then why they do not spur growth in North Korea?, etc.
Acemoglu (2009) argues that these challenges are solvable if we take into account the role
of institutions. In this light, hence, culture may be viewed as a complement to institutional
factors.
The influence of institutions was first emphasized by North and Thomas (1973), and then
advanced by North (1981), Landes (1998), and others, arguing that institutional factors,
which facilitate the property rights and enhance technological progress as well as the diffu-
sion of knowledge, were fundamental factors in the early European transition to sustained
economic growth and the great divergence across the globe. Recently, Acemoglu et al. (2005)
show that economic outcomes are shaped by economic institutions through the incentives and
constraints they impose on economic agents. There is generally a conflict over social choices
because different groups and individuals typically benefit differently from different economic
institutions. Such a conflict is ultimately solved in favor of groups with greater political
power. The political power of each group is determined by political institutions and the
distribution of resources. They argue that: “Economic institutions encouraging economic
growth emerge when political institutions allocate power to groups with interests in broad-
based property rights enforcement, when they create effective constraints on power-holders,
and when there are relatively few rents to be captured by power-holders”. So, differences in
political institutions lead to differences in economic performance, and hence lead to diver-
gence across societies.
The effects of geography on economic growth and divergence between societies have been
emphasized recently by Jones (1981), Diamond (1997), Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1998),
and Ashraf and Galor (2012), and others. The geography hypothesis, first and foremost, is
the fact that not all regions of the world are equally apt for living and production. Nature,
that is, the ecological and geographical environment of nations may play a major role in their
2As mentioned in Ashraf and Galor (2011), the term “culture” refers to the set of society’s norms, beliefs, customs, traditions,
taboos, codes of conduct, etc., and it is therefore distinct from the notion of “institutions”, which has been regarded in the
literature as embodying the sociopolitical environment determined by constitutions, laws, and property rights.
3Asian Tigers refer to South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong
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economic experiences. There are at least three main branches of geography hypothesis, each
emphasizing different mechanism for how geography affects prosperity. The first one, and also
the earliest one, is proposed by Montesquieu in 1748. He believed that climate, in particular
heat, shaped human attitudes and effort, and through this channel, it affects both economic
and social outcomes. The second one, which is developed by Gunnar Myrdal, emphasizes
the impact of geography on the technologies available to a society, especially in agriculture.
Myrdal (1968, p.2121) wrote: “Serious study of the problems of underdevelopment should take
into account the climate and its impacts on soil, vegetation, animals, humans and physical
assets - in short, on living conditions in economic development”. The third variant of the
geography hypothesis, which is proposed by Jefferey Sachs, links poverty in many areas of the
world to their disease burden, emphasizing that “the burden of infectious disease is higher
in the tropics than in the temperate zones” (Sachs, 2001). In this paper, the geographical
factor is likely closer to the second version of geography hypothesis.
In the widely popular book “Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies”,
Jared Diamond (1997) provides a historical account along with research results from other
sciences such as biology, geography, archeology, epidemiology, etc., to explain why the world
becomes so unequal across communities. And why some regions, peoples, and cultures de-
veloped more quickly than others. Diamond pushes the series of causes and consequences
back to 13,000 years ago to reach the conclusion that the origin of the great divergence is
due to initial differences in geographical and biological conditions. Like espousing the sec-
ond view of geography hypothesis, he argues that geographical differences between Americas
and Eurasia determined the timing and nature of settled agriculture and, by means of this
channel, shaped whether societies were able to develop complex organizations and advanced
civilian and military technologies. Although whether the study of human societies can be
pursued as scientifically is still a controversy, the work of Diamond depicts the most general
picture of human history during the last 13,000 years and shows a way for other sciences to
develop theories of development.
Ashraf and Galor (2012) provide a mechanism linking geographical isolation to cultural
diversity, affecting the creation and accumulation of knowledge, to explain the asymmetric
evolutions across societies. They show that societies characterized by less geographical vul-
nerability to cultural diffusion benefited from enhanced assimilation, lower cultural diversity,
and more intense accumulation of society-specific human capital. So, these societies were
more efficient with respect to their production-possibility frontier and flourished in the agri-
cultural stage of development. However, the lack of cultural diffusion diminished the ability
of these societies to adapt to new technological paradigms, which delayed their industrializa-
tion and, hence, their take-off to a sustained growth regime. Their empirical analysis shows
that (i) geographical isolation prevalent in pre-industrial period has had a persistent negative
impact on the extent of contemporary cultural diversity; (ii) pre-industrial geographical iso-
lation had a positive impact on economic development in the agricultural stage but has had
a negative impact on income per capita in the course of industrialization; and (iii) cultural
diversity has had a positive impact on economic development in the industrialization process.
Other approaches to explain the asymmetric evolutions across the globe are based on the
roles of ethnic, linguistic, religious fractionalization, and human genetic diversity. The effects
of ethnolinguistic fractionalization on comparative development across societies are examined
empirically by Easterly and Levine (1997) and Alesina et al. (2003). These papers have
demonstrated that geopolitical factors, which brought a high degree of ethnic fractionalization
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in some regions of the world, led to the implementation of poor institutions and, hence, to
a divergence in the development process across societies. Ashraf and Galor (2013) advance
and empirically establish a hypothesis that, in the prehistoric course of Homo-sapiens out of
Africa, the variation in migratory distance to various destinations across the globe has affected
the genetic diversity and has had a persistent hump-shaped effect on comparative economic
development. Ashraf and Galor (2013) show that the low diversity of Native American
and the high diversity of African have been detrimental for the development process of these
regions, while the intermediate levels of diversity of European and Asian have been conducive
for their development process.
3 The benchmark model
In this paper, we focus on the geography hypothesis proposed by Myrdal (1968) as mentioned
in the literature review section, i.e. we consider the impact of geography on the technology
available to a society, especially in agriculture. Of course, geography is not everything in
explaining the asymmetric development across countries, but from previous research in the
literature, geography seems to play a crucial role, at least, in the early stages of development.
We consider competitive overlapping generations economies in the process of development
with two sectors of production, agriculture and manufacture, and one final output. We
assume that the factors of production in the agricultural sector are land and unskilled labor,
and the only factor of production in the manufacturing sector is skilled labor. In any period,
each individual in the economy chooses a number of skilled children and unskilled children
as well as consumption, under the budget constraint, so as to maximize his/her utility.
3.1 Environmental resources for agriculture
We refer by “land”, which is absent in Galor and Mountford (2006), to the entire geographical
environment and natural resources of the economy supporting agricultural production. Due
to technological constraint, an economy may not make the most of the available “land”
(i.e. entire natural resources and geographical environment) for agricultural production, e.g.
people may just occupy the part of their territory and resources that are the most suitable
for agriculture. This “part of land” is called “productive land” whose size in period t, Xt, is
determined by
Xt = χ(At)X (1)
where χ(At) ∈ (0, 1) is the level of accessibility to the “land” depending on the level of
technology in period t, At; χ
′(At) > 0, χ′′(At) < 0; X is the entire natural resources and
geographical environment for agricultural production. Without lost of generality, we nor-
malize X = 1 for simplicity. Hereafter, therefore, the natural resources and geographical
environment available for agricultural production in period t is Xt = χ(At).
3.2 Production
In every period t, output can be produced in the agricultural sector and/or in the manufac-
turing sector. The agricultural sector uses unskilled labor and “land” as factors of production
to produce output according to Cobb-Douglas production technology
Y at = χ(At)
α(Lut )
1−α; α ∈ (0, 1) (2)
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where Lut is the aggregate amount of unskilled labor of the economy in period t.
Indeed, the way the use of “land” for agricultural production is modeled here differs from
that in Ashraf and Galor (2012) by making it depend on technology. In Ashraf and Galor
(2012), land for agricultural production is always fixed at X = 1 regardless of the level of
technology. That paper, however, introduces a level of technology specific for agriculture
whose dynamics can be traced to depend on the geographical isolation of the economy. That
is to say Ashraf and Galor (2012) consider the effect of a geographical factor differing from
that in this paper for agricultural production.
We assume that, in the context of an early stage of development, there is no property
rights to “land” (i.e. geographical environment and resources), so that the return to land is
zero4 and the return to labor, or the inverse demand for labor , in the agricultural sector in
period t is
wut =
(
χ(At)
Lut
)α
(3)
Similar to Ashraf and Galor (2012), the output of the manufacturing sector in period t is
determined by a linear, constant returns to scale production technology such that
Y mt = AtL
s
t (4)
where Lst is the aggregate amount of skilled labor of the economy in period t. The return to
labor, or the inverse demand for labor , in the manufacturing sector in period t is
wst = At (5)
The total labor force of the economy in period t is
Lt = L
u
t + L
s
t (6)
3.3 Technology
The dynamics of technological level is defined by
At+1 = (1 + gt)At (7)
where gt is the rate of technological progress between periods t and t + 1. We assume that
gt depends on the average skill of labor in the economy, i.e. it is determined by the fraction
of skilled labor in the economy. In particular,
gt = g(ht)
where ht = L
s
t/Lt is the fraction of skilled labor over the total labor force of the economy in
period t; g(h) > 0, g′(h) > 0, ∀h ≥ 0.
3.4 Individuals
Basically, the individual’s problem in this paper follows from Galor and Mountford (2006).
We use superscripts ”u” and ”s” to denote for unskilled and skilled labor respectively. In
4We can justify the assumption of “no property rights to land” as: (i) “land” in our model stands for the entire geographical
environment and resources then basically “land” is collectively owned with the proceeds distributed as a lump sum to the
population; (ii) we consider a completely aggregate economy, so the model disregards the heterogeneity across households, say
labourers and “landlords”; in addition, (iii) although there is no property right to these resources, the economy cannot engage
in the over-exploit action of common resources known as the “tragedy of commons” because the accessibility to these resources
is constrained by the technological level through the function χ(A).
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every period t ∈ N, a generation consists of Lut identical unskilled individuals working in the
agricultural sector and Lst identical skilled individuals working in the manufacturing sector.
Individuals live for two periods. In the first period, say childhood, they consume a fraction of
their parent’s time. In the second period, say adulthood, they allocate their time endowment
between child-rearing and labor force participation.
As in Galor and Mountford (2006), the utility of an adult i ∈ {s, u} in period t comes
from consumption and the total potential income of his/her children. In particular,
uit = γ ln(w
s
t+1n
s,i
t + w
u
t+1n
u,i
t ) + (1− γ) ln cit (8)
where ns,it and n
u,i
t are the number of children to be skilled and unskilled workers respectively;
wst+1 and w
u
t+1 are their wages in period t + 1 respectively; c
i
t is total amount of consuming
agricultural goods and manufacturing goods by individual i. We assume here these two kinds
of good are perfectly substitutable.
The budged constraint of an adult i in period t is
cit + w
i
t(φ
sns,it + φ
unu,it ) ≤ wit (9)
where φs and φu are costs in time to raise one offspring to be a skilled worker and a unskilled
worker, respectively. We assume that φs > φu, implying raising a skilled child is more costly
than raising an unskilled one.
An adult individual i ∈ {s, u} in period t chooses the number of skilled and unskilled
children and consumption under the budget constraint (9) so as to maximize his/her utility
(8), i.e.
max
cit>0;n
s,i
t ,n
u,i
t ≥0
γ ln
(
wst+1n
s,i
t + w
u
t+1n
u,i
t
)
+ (1− γ) ln cit
subject to
cit + w
i
t
(
ns,it φ
s + nu,it φ
u
) ≤ wit
Solving the individual’s problem above (see Appendix A1), we have
cit = (1− γ)wit (10)
ns,it φ
s + nu,it φ
u = γ (11)
where
ns,it = 0, n
u,i
t =
γ
φu
if
wst+1
φs
<
wut+1
φu
ns,it =
γ
φs
, nu,it = 0 if
wst+1
φs
>
wut+1
φu
ns,it > 0 and n
u,i
t > 0 only if
wst+1
φs
=
wut+1
φu
.
It is obvious from the homotheticity of preferences that the fertility and the composition
between skilled and unskilled children do not depend on the income of their parent. Hence,
hereafter in every period t, we remove the superscript i from variables ns,it and n
u,i
t to write
as nst and n
u
t respectively.
To guarantee the population never collapses, we assume that
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γφs
≥ 1 (A1).
The assumption (A1) guarantees the growth rate of population is always non-negative.
This assumption is rather consistent with the reality which is observed widely that population
grows in most countries.
We know from (3) that the return to unskilled labor in period t + 1 depends on the size
of unskilled population, Lut+1. And it will be apparent in section 4 (in Corollary 1) that the
viability of the manufacturing sector in period t+ 1 depends on the size of population, Lt+1.
When the manufacturing sector is viable in period t + 1, the individuals will be indifferent
between raising skilled and unskilled children when it holds
wst+1
φs
=
wut+1
φu
. That is to say the
choices of numbers of skilled children and unskilled children of individuals in period t depend
on the expected structure of labor in period t+1. We assume that individuals in period t has
a perfect foresight on the structure of labor in period t + 1, het+1. Hence, in the perspective
of individuals, the choices of skilled and unskilled children are determined by
nstφ
s + nut φ
u = γ
and
nst
nst + n
u
t
= het+1
i.e.
nst =
γhet+1
(φs − φu)het+1 + φu
≡ ns(het+1)
nut =
γ(1− het+1)
(φs − φu)het+1 + φu
≡ nu(het+1)
4 Equilibrium in the labor market
It is a fact that, as it will be apparent later, in the early stages of development, when the
technological level is sufficiently low so that the labor productivity of the manufacturing
sector is low relative to that of the agricultural sector, then output is produced only by
the agricultural sector. However, in later stages of development, when the technological
level is high enough, increasing the labor productivity of the manufacturing sector, then the
manufacturing sector is economically viable.
The inverse demand for labor in the agricultural sector, as in (3), increases without bound
when employment in that sector decreases. This implies that in a closed economy the agri-
cultural sector is operative in every period. In contrast to the agricultural sector, the man-
ufacturing sector is operative if, and only if the productivity in this sector is high enough.
Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 below state the condition under which the manufacturing
sector is economically viable.
Proposition 1: In any period t, there exists a unique threshold of technological
level, Aˆt = Aˆ(Lt), such that the manufacturing sector is operative if, and only if:
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At ≥ Aˆ(Lt) where Aˆ′(Lt) < 0
Proof : It follows from (3), (5), and the individual’s optimization problem in period t − 1
that:
(i) If At
φs
>
(
χ(At)
Lut
)α
/φu then nst−1 > 0, and
(ii) nst−1 > 0 only if
At
φs
≥
(
χ(At)
Lut
)α
/φu.
Now we prove that
nst−1

> 0 if At
φs
>
(
χ(At)
Lt
)α
/φu
= 0 if At
φs
≤
(
χ(At)
Lt
)α
/φu
(1)
(2)
(Note that in the denominators there is Lt instead of L
u
t ).
The statement (1) can be rewritten as
(1) If At
φs
>
(
χ(At)
Lt
)α
/φu then Lut < Lt (i.e. L
s
t > 0 or n
s
t−1 > 0).
We prove (1) by a contradiction. In effect, if Lut = Lt (i.e. L
s
t = 0 or n
s
t−1 = 0) then
At
φs
>
(
χ(At)
Lt
)α
/φu
is equivalent to
At
φs
>
(
χ(At)
Lut
)α
/φu
which implies (from (i) above) that nst−1 > 0, leading to a contradiction with n
s
t−1 = 0.
The statement (2) can be rewritten as
(2) If At
φs
≤
(
χ(At)
Lt
)α
/φu then Lut = Lt (i.e. L
s
t = 0 or n
s
t−1 = 0).
We prove (2) by establishing its negation. In effect, if Lut < Lt (i.e. L
s
t > 0 or n
s
t−1 > 0)
then, from (ii), it holds
At
φs
≥
(
χ(At)
Lut
)α
/φu.
Moreover, since Lut < Lt then
(
χ(At)
Lut
)α
/φu >
(
χ(At)
Lt
)α
/φu, from which we have
At
φs
>
(
χ(At)
Lt
)α
/φu
which is the negation of the condition At
φs
≤
(
χ(At)
Lt
)α
/φu.
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Hence, the manufacturing sector is economically viable in period t (i.e. nst−1 > 0) if, and only
if, the marginal return to labor in that sector per unit of time raising skilled labor, At/φ
s, is
higher than in the agricultural sector per unit of time raising unskilled labor,
(
χ(At)
Lt
)α
/φu,
when the entire labor force is employed in the agricultural sector, i.e.
At
φs
>
(
χ(At)
Lt
)α
φu
⇔ At
χ(At)α
>
φs
φu
L−αt
Let ψ(At) =
At
χ(At)α
, which is monotonically increasing in At. In effect,
ψ′(At) =
χ(At)− αAtχ′(At)
χ(At)α+1
> 0
since χ(At) ∈ (0, 1) is strictly increasing concave and α ∈ (0, 1), it holds χ(At)−αAtχ′(At) >
0. Moreover,
ψ(0) = 0 and lim
At→+∞
ψ(At) = +∞
Therefore, given Lt, there exists a unique Aˆt such that
Aˆt
χ(Aˆt)α
=
φs
φu
L−αt (12)
By applying the implicit function theorem, we have
Aˆt = Aˆ(Lt) where Aˆ
′(Lt) =
−αφs
L1+αt φ
u
χ(Aˆt)
1+α
χ(Aˆt)− αAˆtχ′(Aˆt)
< 0
Moreover, it is straightforward that
lim
Lt→0+
Aˆ(Lt) = +∞ and lim
Lt→+∞
Aˆ(Lt) = 0
Q.E.D.
Corollary 1: Given At > 0, there always exists a unique threshold size of popu-
lation, Lˆt, such that the manufacturing sector is operative in period t if, and only
if
Lt ≥ Lˆt =
(
φs
φu
)1/α
χ(At)
A
1/α
t
.
Proof : It is straightforward from the necessary and sufficient conditions for the manufac-
turing sector to be operative, i.e., At/φ
s ≥
(
χ(At)
Lt
)α
/φu. Q.E.D.
The Figure 6 below presents the equilibrium in the labor market and shows intuitively
when the manufacturing sector is viable.
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Figure 6. The equilibrium in the labor market
5 Impact of technology on fertility and the composition of labor
Before examining the dynamical system of the economy in the next section, it is interesting
to analyze in this section the impact of technological progress on fertility and the structure of
labor. These analyses will help us to understand better the simultaneous evolution of fertility
and the structure of labor along with technology.
When the manufacturing is viable, then at the equilibrium it holds
wst
φs
=
wut
φu
i.e.
At
φs
=
(
χ(At)
Lut
)α
φu
⇔ Lut =
(
φs
φu
)1/α
χ(At)
A
1/α
t
(13)
So the fraction of skilled labor is determined by
ht = 1− L
u
t
Lt
=

0 if At ≤ Aˆ(Lt)
1−
(
φs
φu
)1/α
χ(At)
A
1/α
t Lt
if At ≥ Aˆ(Lt)
≡ h(At, Lt) (14)
We have
∂ht
∂At
=

0 if At < Aˆ(Lt)
(
φs
φu
)1/α 1
α
χ(At)−χ′(At)At
A
1+α
α
t Lt
> 0 if At > Aˆ(Lt)
and
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lim
At→+∞
ht = lim
At→+∞
[
1−
(
φs
φu
)1/α
χ(At)
A
1/α
t Lt
]
= 1
We know from (11), lagged one period, that
nst−1φ
s + nut−1φ
u = γ (15)
The fertility rate of the economy in period t− 1 is
nt−1 = nst−1 + n
u
t−1
At the perfect foresight competitive equilibrium, we have het = ht. It is straightforward
that, the fraction of skilled labor in period t can be rewritten as
ht =
nst−1
nst−1 + n
u
t−1
(16)
From (14), (15), and (16) we have
nst−1 =
γh(At, Lt)
(φs − φu)h(At, Lt) + φu ≡ n
s(h(At, Lt))
nut−1 =
γ(1− h(At, Lt))
(φs − φu)h(At, Lt) + φu ≡ n
u(h(At, Lt))
nt−1 = nst−1 + n
u
t−1 =
γ
(φs − φu)h(At, Lt) + φu ≡ n(h(At, Lt))
As in (14), when At ≤ Aˆ(Lt) then h(At, Lt) = 0, therefore, in this case
nst−1 = 0
nt−1 = nut−1 =
γ
φu
and when At > Aˆ(Lt) then
∂nst−1
∂At
=
γφu
[(φs − φu)h(At, Lt) + φu]2
∂h(At, Lt)
∂At
> 0
∂nut−1
∂At
=
−γφs
[(φs − φu)h(At, Lt) + φu]2
∂h(At, Lt)
∂At
< 0
∂nt−1
∂At
=
γ(φu − φs)
[(φs − φu)h(At, Lt) + φu]2
∂h(At, Lt)
∂At
< 0
And
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lim
At→+∞
nt−1 = lim
At→+∞
nst−1 =
γ
φs
and lim
At→+∞
nut−1 = 0
Figure 7 below presents intuitively the impact of technology on fertility and the structure of
labor.
Figure 7. Fertility and structure of labor against technology
6 Competitive equilibrium and Dynamical system
The perfect foresight competitive equilibrium of the economy is characterized by (i) the
household utility maximization under the constraints, (ii) the equilibrium in the labor mar-
kets, (iii) the dynamics of the technological level, and (iv) the dynamics of population and
the structure of labor. Therefore, the perfect foresight competitive equilibrium is a sequence
of {cit, nst , nut , wst , wut , At+1, Lt+1, ht+1}t≥0 is determined by the following system of equations
cit = (1− γ)wit i ∈ {s, u}
nst =
γhet+1
(φs − φu)het+1 + φu
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nut =
γ(1− het+1)
(φs − φu)het+1 + φu
wst = At
wut =
(
χ(At)
Lt(1− ht)
)α
At+1 = [1 + g(ht)]At
Lt+1 =
γLt
(φs − φu)ht+1 + φu
het+1 = ht+1
ht+1 =

0 if At+1 ≤ Aˆ(Lt+1)
1−
(
φs
φu
)1/α
χ(At+1)
A
1/α
t Lt+1
if At+1 ≥ Aˆ(Lt+1)
for given A0, L0, and h0; where Aˆ(Lt+1) is the only solution to (12) given Lt+1.
The perfect foresight competitive equilibrium can be fully characterized by the following
reduced system describing the equilibrium dynamics of technological level, population size,
and structure of labor.
At+1 = [1 + g(ht)]At (17)
Lt+1 =
γLt
(φs − φu)ht+1 + φu (18)
ht+1 =

0 if At+1 ≤ Aˆ(Lt+1)
1−
(
φs
φu
)1/α
χ(At+1)
A
1/α
t+1Lt+1
if At+1 ≥ Aˆ(Lt+1)
(19)
for given initial conditions A0, L0, and h0.
This system defines {At+1, Lt+1, ht+1} to be a function of its lagged value {At, Lt, ht}.
In effect, when At+1 ≤ Aˆ(Lt+1) then
At+1 = [1 + g(ht)]At
Lt+1 =
γLt
φu
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ht+1 = 0
while when At+1 ≥ Aˆ(Lt+1), we have
At+1 = [1 + g(ht)]At
Lt+1 [(φ
s − φu)ht+1 + φu] = γLt
Lt+1(1− ht+1) =
(
φs
φu
)1/α
χ ([1 + g(ht)]At)
([1 + g(ht)]At)
α
implying that there always exists an equilibrium.
We now study the development process of a country from the agricultural regime transiting
to the manufacturing regime (or so-called the industrial regime). Consider an economy in
its early stages of development characterized by a sufficiently low level of technology, i.e.
A0 < Aˆ0 = Aˆ(L0) such that only the agricultural sector is operative. In this regime, fertility
is very high and constant at a rate γ/φu, and the entire labor force consists of unskilled
labor, because individuals have no economic incentives to raise skilled offspring, leading to
technology grow very slowly at a rate g(0).
Over time, from date t onwards, when technology has accumulated enough, i.e. At ≥ Aˆt,
guaranteeing the manufacturing sector to be viable, then individuals raise less unskilled
offspring in order to raise more skilled ones, because of their utility maximization behavior,
and the increase in the technological level. This makes the structure of labor change towards
an increasing fraction of skilled workers in the labor force. Because the cost in time of
raising a skilled offspring is higher than that of raising an unskilled one, then the increase
in the technological level leads to a decrease in fertility accompanied with an increase in
the fraction of skilled worker. The higher fraction of skilled worker, in turn, speeds up the
technological progress. This feedback loop between technology and the fraction of skilled
worker accelerates the industrialization of the economy characterized by the expansion of
the manufacturing sector along with the simultaneous reduction in agricultural sector. Over
time, the fertility converges to a constant low rate γ/φs, the fraction of skilled labor converges
to 1.
7 Geography and a Tale of two countries
We define the timing of industrialization to be the time when the manufacturing sector starts
to be economically viable, i.e. when it holds
At/φ
s =
(
χ(At)
Lt
)α
/φu
This section studies how geography affects the timing and speed of industrialization in the
development process of an economy, and it also analyzes a tale of two countries, which differ
only in the geography, about the possibility of reversal of fortunes between them. We know
from the Proposition 1 that the manufacturing sector is economically viable if, and only if
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At
φs
≥
(
χ(At)
Lt
)α
φu
i.e
At
χ(At)α
≥ φ
s
φuLαt
which implies At ≥ Aˆ(Lt).
We say that, country C has more geographical advantage for agriculture production than
country B if the following property holds
χC(A) > χB(A) ∀A.
Proposition 2 below states the effect of geographical advantage for agricultural production
on the timing of industrialization.
Proposition 2: In the overlapping generations economy above, the more geograph-
ical advantage for agriculture, the later the timings of industrialization and demo-
graphic transition.
Proof : In effect, let us consider two countries B and C which have the same initial
conditions A0 > 0, L0 > 0, and h0 = 0 and are identical except that country C has a
geographical advantage for agricultural production over country B, i.e.
χC(At) > χB(At) ∀At
which implies
At
χB(At)α
>
At
χC(At)α
∀At. (20)
Assume that both countries start from the agricultural production regime. As shown in
section 4, before the manufacturing sector is operative, i.e. when the level of technology is
sufficiently low, the population grows at a constant rate γ/φu. So the populations of countries
B and C are the same during the agricultural development process until at least one of these
countries starts having manufacturing production, and hence during this process the growth
rates of technological levels in the two countries are the same at a constant g(0). So (20)
implies that the manufacturing sector is operative in country B before in country C, i.e. the
timing of industrialization in country B precedes that of country C.
The industrialization in country B triggers the decline in fertility along with the change
in the labor structure towards an increase in the fraction of skilled labor. Hence, the demo-
graphic transition in country B also precedes that of country C.
Q.E.D.
The Proposition 2 shows that the timing of industrialization in a country with less geo-
graphical advantage for agricultural production, country B, precedes that of a country with
a geographical advantage for agricultural production, country C. This is because during the
agricultural development process, the return to labor in agricultural production in country
B is always less than that in country C, while the returns to labor in the manufacturing
sector, if it were operative, in both countries would be the same due to the same level of
technology. So, although in the agricultural development process country C is more prosper-
ous than country B, country C needs a higher level of technology (than country B) to start
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industrializing, i.e. country C needs more time for technological accumulation to incentivize
individuals to raise skilled offspring. As a result, the timing of industrialization in country
B precedes that of country C. Country B enters the industrialization process along with a
reduction of the fertility rate, an increase of the fraction of skilled labor, and an accelerated
technological progress, while country C continues its agricultural development with a high
fertility rate and slow technological progress.
8 Conclusion
This paper develops a unified endogenous growth model to explain the development from
agricultural production to manufacturing production along with the demographic transition
and an increasing fraction of skilled workers in the labor force. The theoretical results are
consistent with the phase of industrial revolution and beyond in Western Europe and Western
Offshoots. By taking into account the geographical factor, this paper sheds some light on
the fact that a geographical advantage for agricultural production makes a country more
prosperous in agricultural regime but delays its industrialization and demographic transition,
as well as delays the labor structure change towards an increasing fraction of skilled labor,
hence inhibiting technological progress. This may help to explain the reversal in fortunes
during the development process between Europe and Asia. This paper points to geography
as a fundamental cause of growth and divergence across societies.
This paper builds on Galor and Mountford (2006) and Ashraf and Galor (2012) introduc-
ing geographical advantage for agricultural production in a single set-up. This single set-up,
however, provides some implications, still absent in both Galor and Mountford (2006) and
Ashraf and Galor (2012), for empirical investigations. They are: (i) a high total factor pro-
ductivity in agriculture delays the demographic transition and industrialization; (ii) fertility,
the structure of labor, and growth are all shaped by a geographical advantage for agricultural
production.
Of course, geography, particularly geographical advantage for agricultural production,
is not everything in explaining the development process and divergence across societies.
However, this paper contributes a geographical viewpoint to this literature. Other viewpoints
based too on geography, culture, institutions, ethnic, linguistic, religious fractionalization,
etc., and also geography to explain the asymmetric development across globe are left for
future research, both in theory and empirics.
9 Appendix
A1. Solving the individual’s problem
The utility maximization of individual i ∈ (s, u) in period t is
max
ct>0;n
s,i
t ,n
u,i
t ≥0
γ ln
(
wst+1n
s,i
t + w
u
t+1n
u,i
t
)
+ (1− γ) ln cit
subject to cit + w
i
t
(
ns,it φ
s + nu,it φ
u
) ≤ wit
Because the maximization problem is convex, then the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are nec-
essary and sufficient for a maximum. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions of this problem are
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
1−γ
cit
γwst+1
wst+1n
s,i
t +w
u
t+1n
u,i
t
γwut+1
wst+1n
s,i
t +w
u
t+1n
u,i
t
 = λ1
 1witφs
witφ
u
+ λ2
 0−1
0
+ λ3
 00
−1

cit + w
i
t
(
ns,it φ
s + nu,it φ
u
)− wit ≤ 0
ns,it ≥ 0
nu,it ≥ 0
λ1
[
cit + w
i
t
(
ns,it φ
s + nu,it φ
u
)− wit] = 0
λ2n
s,i
t = 0
λ3n
u,i
t = 0
λ1, λ2, λ3 ≥ 0
i.e.
1− γ
cit
= λ1 > 0
cit + w
i
t
(
ns,it φ
s + nu,it φ
u
)− wit = 0
ns,it ≥ 0
nu,it ≥ 0
γwst+1
wst+1n
s,i
t + w
u
t+1n
u,i
t
=
1− γ
cit
witφ
s − λ2
γwut+1
wst+1n
s,i
t + w
u
t+1n
u,i
t
=
1− γ
cit
witφ
u − λ3
λ2n
s,i
t = 0
λ3n
u,i
t = 0
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λ2, λ3 ≥ 0
 (i) If at the solution the positivity constraint on skilled children is binding and the one
to unskilled children is not binding, i.e. ns,it = 0, n
u,i
t > 0, then λ2 ≥ 0, λ3 = 0, and
hence
γ
nu,it
=
1− γ
cit
witφ
u
cit + w
i
tn
u,i
t φ
u = wit
Therefore, we have
cit = (1− γ)wit
nu,it =
γ
φu
 (ii) If at the solution the positivity constraint on skilled children is not binding and the
one on unskilled children is binding, i.e. ns,it > 0, n
u,i
t = 0, then λ2 = 0, λ3 ≥ 0, and
γ
nu,it
=
1− γ
cit
witφ
s
cit + w
i
tn
s,i
t φ
s = wit
Therefore, we have
cit = (1− γ)wit
ns,it =
γ
φs
 (iii) If solution is interior, i.e. ns,it > 0, n
u,i
t > 0, then λ2 = 0, λ3 = 0, and hence
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γwst+1
wst+1n
s,i
t + w
u
t+1n
u,i
t
=
1− γ
cit
witφ
s
γwut+1
wst+1n
s,i
t + w
u
t+1n
u,i
t
=
1− γ
cit
witφ
u
which imply that it must hold
wst+1
wut+1
=
φs
φu
Therefore,
γwut+1
wst+1n
s,i
t + w
u
t+1n
u,i
t
=
1− γ
cit
witφ
u ⇔ γ
wst+1
wut+1
ns,it + n
u,i
t
=
1− γ
cit
witφ
u
⇔ γ
ns,it φ
s + nu,it φ
u
=
1− γ
cit
wit (21)
We also have
cit + w
i
t
(
ns,it φ
s + nu,it φ
u
)
= wit (22)
then from (21) and (22) we have
cit = (1− γ)wit
ns,it φ
s + nu,it φ
u = γ
So, in all cases (i), (ii), and (iii), we have
cit = (1− γ)wit
ns,it φ
s + nu,it φ
u = γ
Now, we will clarify under what conditions each corresponding case occurs. We know
from the two last equations that the allocation of resources between raising children and
consumption is always constant. The last equation shows that the total time for raising
children is also always constant. So the optimization problem of individuals boils down to
determine the optimal choice between skilled and unskilled children so as to maximize their
total income, wst+1n
s,i
t + w
u
t+1n
u,i
t , under the constraint n
s,i
t φ
s + nu,it φ
u = γ.
From the last equation we have
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0 ≤ ns,it ≤
γ
φs
0 ≤ nu,it ≤
γ
φu
We have
wst+1n
s,i
t + w
u
t+1n
u,i
t = w
s
t+1n
s,i
t + w
u
t+1
γ − ns,it φs
φu
=
(
wst+1 − wut+1
φs
φu
)
ns,it + w
u
t+1
γ
φu
 If
wst+1
φs
<
wut+1
φu
, then
(
wst+1n
s,i
t + w
u
t+1n
u,i
t
)
max
= wut+1
γ
φu
when ns,it = 0 and n
u,i
t =
γ
φu
.
 If
wst+1
φs
>
wut+1
φu
, then
(
wst+1n
s,i
t + w
u
t+1n
u,i
t
)
max
=
(
wst+1 − wut+1 φ
s
φu
)
γ
φs
when ns,it =
γ
φs
and
nu,it = 0.
 If
wst+1
φs
=
wut+1
φu
, then any composition satisfying ns,it φ
s+nu,it φ
u = γ is an optimal solution.
In summary, we have
ns,it = 0, n
u,i
t =
γ
φu
if
wst+1
φs
<
wut+1
φu
ns,it =
γ
φs
, nu,it = 0 if
wst+1
φs
>
wut+1
φu
ns,it > 0, n
u,i
t > 0 only if
wst+1
φs
=
wut+1
φu
.
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